Niall Ferguson is a professor of history at Harvard and most recently the author of The Ascent of Money, which is quite a good book. He also wrote The Pity of War: Explaining World War One (1998), and the two-volume set The House of Rothschild (also 1998). His article An Empire at Risk in the upcoming issue of Newsweek is long and detailed, but well worth reading. There is little question that the government's profligate spending over the past few decades, culminating in the heart-stopping $1.4 TRILLION deficit this year, is unsustainable. And it appears that this Congress, believing (correctly or incorrectly) that the last election gave it a mandate to implement all the liberal programs that the Democratic Party has hoped for for years, is ideologically incapable of cutting government spending and raising taxes to begin to pay off the national debt, or even to reduce the annual deficit.
In the end it is economic power that is at the base of all international power. Without economic power, nations can't afford the military power needed to defend their national interests. Without economic power, nations can't afford the investments in education and innovation that make their citizens highly productive. Without economic power, nations can't afford to build and maintain the complex infrastructure that a modern society needs. Without economic power, nations can't afford the continuing capital investment needed to maintain their economic power.
Ferguson argues that we in America are in danger of losing our economic dominance in the world because of our unwise government policies - most particularly our inability to be realistic about our finances. The government for decades, under both parties, has spent far more than it takes in, yet has been unable to summon the political will to raise taxes and/or cut government spending. Yet these are the only two options available to reverse our increasing indebtedness.
A sobering argument.
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Friday, November 27, 2009
Recommended: Afghan Mythologies
I tend to look for articles and books that give me a different perspective, that make me questions some of my own assumptions and beliefs, or that shed new light on issues. After finding yesterday's Victor David Hanson article (see preceding post) I read through some of his other recent articles. His November 5 article Afghan Mythologies made me sit up and take notice. I have believed some of his Afghan mythologies, but this article made me reexamine them.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Recommended: We Ain't Seen Nothing Yet
Thanksgiving Day ought to be a time to be thankful for what we have, and we in America have a great deal for which to be thankful. So it may seem ungenerous on this day to recommend a pessimistic piece like Victor David Hanson's We Ain't Seen Nothing Yet. But in fact, lucky as we are to live in America today, we as a society are squandering our blessings at an irresponsible rate, as Hanson points out.
It is easy to gripe about this administration, or about the last one. It is easy to grumble about how clueless this Democratic Congress is, or how equally clueless the last Republican Congress was. But in fact we are a democracy, so the buck really stops with us - with we the voters who were unwise enough to put these people into power in the first place, and are now unwise enough to keep them there. We voters, who can be so easily lead by party labels, so easily bought by a few unrealistic promises, so easily seduced by clever campaign rhetoric, so easily distracted by emotional issues, so easily conned by professional spin doctors and image makers, so easily shaped by the network's talking heads.
Like some sports figures who have it all yet end up penniless, we in America have it all, and yet we are well on the way to letting our political leaders in both parties squander it all and leave us penniless and ruined.
Sorry for the pessimism on this day of thanksgiving, but I really would like my grandchildren to still have something to be thankful for when they grow up -- and for that to happen we the voters need to grow up, FAST, and begin to get real!
It is easy to gripe about this administration, or about the last one. It is easy to grumble about how clueless this Democratic Congress is, or how equally clueless the last Republican Congress was. But in fact we are a democracy, so the buck really stops with us - with we the voters who were unwise enough to put these people into power in the first place, and are now unwise enough to keep them there. We voters, who can be so easily lead by party labels, so easily bought by a few unrealistic promises, so easily seduced by clever campaign rhetoric, so easily distracted by emotional issues, so easily conned by professional spin doctors and image makers, so easily shaped by the network's talking heads.
Like some sports figures who have it all yet end up penniless, we in America have it all, and yet we are well on the way to letting our political leaders in both parties squander it all and leave us penniless and ruined.
Sorry for the pessimism on this day of thanksgiving, but I really would like my grandchildren to still have something to be thankful for when they grow up -- and for that to happen we the voters need to grow up, FAST, and begin to get real!
Recommended: Amateur Hour at the White House,
Leslie Gelb is a former correspondent for The New York Times and is currently President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as an Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration from 1977 to 1979. He is author of the recent New York Times best-seller Power Rules: How Common Sense can Rescue American Foreign Policy (about which more in a later post). He knows what he is talking about.
I recommend his recent article Amateur Hour at the White House, in which he points out that for all of President Obamas traveling the globe and glad-handing world leaders, not much of substance is resulting, and for good reason. As his book Power Rules points out, nations don't respond to high-minded appeals or charismatic personalities -- they never did. They respond to national self-interest, and deals come about when carrots and/or sticks change their perception of their national interests.
I recommend his recent article Amateur Hour at the White House, in which he points out that for all of President Obamas traveling the globe and glad-handing world leaders, not much of substance is resulting, and for good reason. As his book Power Rules points out, nations don't respond to high-minded appeals or charismatic personalities -- they never did. They respond to national self-interest, and deals come about when carrots and/or sticks change their perception of their national interests.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Recommended: Dealing with America's fiscal hole
I recommend the article Dealing with America's fiscal hole in the Nov 19 issue of The Economist. Clearly we are on an unsustainable path with the growing federal debt. Just as clearly, neither the administration nor Congress is paying nearly enough attention to this issue yet. Indeed, both are still on a path to substantially increase the debt with politically-appealing but fiscally-questionable legislation like the current health care bill.
I agree with The Economist. While now is not the time to raise taxes or sharply cut government spending - not until the recovery is somewhat less fragile - the administration has to field a credible long-term plan soon to bring the deficit down. The health care debate, in which political ideology and posturing in both parties has completely overcome practical economics, does not suggest that this Congress is capable of crafting a credible long-term debt-reduction plan.
I agree with The Economist. While now is not the time to raise taxes or sharply cut government spending - not until the recovery is somewhat less fragile - the administration has to field a credible long-term plan soon to bring the deficit down. The health care debate, in which political ideology and posturing in both parties has completely overcome practical economics, does not suggest that this Congress is capable of crafting a credible long-term debt-reduction plan.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Recommended: The Future of War
I have continued to read George Friedman’s earlier works, and have just finished the 1996 book The Future of War, by George and his wife Meredith Friedman (see book list in the side bar for details). It is well worth reading.
The Friedmans make the point that every weapon begins from its invention a progress toward senility, in which the defensive costs of protecting the weapon against evolving countermeasures escalate while the ability of the weapon to project power remain more or less static. At some point the defensive burden becomes so great that the weapon is essentially useless.
Thus the tank was invincible at first, but as opposing tanks mounted heavier guns and anti-tank rockets improved tanks had to carry more and more armor, until now a tank weights 50 tons or more, and yet can be destroyed by a relatively inexpensive anti-tank missile from a single infantryman or a helicopter miles away.
Similarly, the aircraft carrier was a brilliant new weapon in World War II, but now must be surrounded by a fleet of destroyers, cruisers and submarines whose only purpose is defense, and even so a couple of inexpensive sea-skimming cruise missiles could destroy it or at least put it out of action in an instant.
Anti-aircraft defenses have improved steadily over the past half century, so than now a $2.2 billion dollar B-2 stealth aircraft is needed to penetrate a good air defense system, yet it’s bomb load of 50,000 pounds is not significantly different than that of an old B-52 bomber. All those extra billions in cost are needed just to defend the plane long enough for it to perform it’s mission.
Of course cultures are slow to adapt, so the military services are loath to give up their manned aircraft, their aircraft carriers, and their tanks, just as earlier generations of military and political leaders were slow to give up walled castles, armored knights, horse cavalry, and massed infantry charges. Nonetheless, the Friedman’s argue, the advent of increasingly intelligent precision munitions, space-based surveillance, GPS guidance systems, and the like will profoundly change the nature of warfare.
Indeed, it already has. Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan are killed by rockets fired from Predator unmanned aircraft controlled by pilots sitting comfortably in bases in the U.S. As we saw in the Gulf War, current precision munitions can be directed through one particular pane of a window of a building. Cruise missiles can fly thousands of miles to their targets, navigating by GPS and by comparing the ground topography under them to their own maps, and deliver munitions within an accuracy of a few feet. Anti-ship missiles can be fired in the general direction of a distant enemy fleet and can find and recognize the ships, decide which is the most valuable, and attack it all on their own with no further human guidance. Small anti-tank munitions can be dispersed a thousand or so feet above an armored column, can recognize their targets (even using millimeter-range radar to distinguish real tanks from dummys), and can select, attack, and destroy a particular tank or armored vehicle in the column all on their own.
Clearly there is a revolution in military affairs in progress, significantly different than the buzz-word bureaucratic efforts of the same name in the Pentagon. And clearly it will change the nature of warfare. The only question is: how fast can the military and political cultures catch up to the changes.
The Friedmans make the point that every weapon begins from its invention a progress toward senility, in which the defensive costs of protecting the weapon against evolving countermeasures escalate while the ability of the weapon to project power remain more or less static. At some point the defensive burden becomes so great that the weapon is essentially useless.
Thus the tank was invincible at first, but as opposing tanks mounted heavier guns and anti-tank rockets improved tanks had to carry more and more armor, until now a tank weights 50 tons or more, and yet can be destroyed by a relatively inexpensive anti-tank missile from a single infantryman or a helicopter miles away.
Similarly, the aircraft carrier was a brilliant new weapon in World War II, but now must be surrounded by a fleet of destroyers, cruisers and submarines whose only purpose is defense, and even so a couple of inexpensive sea-skimming cruise missiles could destroy it or at least put it out of action in an instant.
Anti-aircraft defenses have improved steadily over the past half century, so than now a $2.2 billion dollar B-2 stealth aircraft is needed to penetrate a good air defense system, yet it’s bomb load of 50,000 pounds is not significantly different than that of an old B-52 bomber. All those extra billions in cost are needed just to defend the plane long enough for it to perform it’s mission.
Of course cultures are slow to adapt, so the military services are loath to give up their manned aircraft, their aircraft carriers, and their tanks, just as earlier generations of military and political leaders were slow to give up walled castles, armored knights, horse cavalry, and massed infantry charges. Nonetheless, the Friedman’s argue, the advent of increasingly intelligent precision munitions, space-based surveillance, GPS guidance systems, and the like will profoundly change the nature of warfare.
Indeed, it already has. Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan are killed by rockets fired from Predator unmanned aircraft controlled by pilots sitting comfortably in bases in the U.S. As we saw in the Gulf War, current precision munitions can be directed through one particular pane of a window of a building. Cruise missiles can fly thousands of miles to their targets, navigating by GPS and by comparing the ground topography under them to their own maps, and deliver munitions within an accuracy of a few feet. Anti-ship missiles can be fired in the general direction of a distant enemy fleet and can find and recognize the ships, decide which is the most valuable, and attack it all on their own with no further human guidance. Small anti-tank munitions can be dispersed a thousand or so feet above an armored column, can recognize their targets (even using millimeter-range radar to distinguish real tanks from dummys), and can select, attack, and destroy a particular tank or armored vehicle in the column all on their own.
Clearly there is a revolution in military affairs in progress, significantly different than the buzz-word bureaucratic efforts of the same name in the Pentagon. And clearly it will change the nature of warfare. The only question is: how fast can the military and political cultures catch up to the changes.
America's weakness
I found the following passage from pp. 338-339 of George Freidman's America's Secret War of particular relevance:
"Our own virtues are substantial,. Our warriors are well armed and well trained. The can endure hardship. Americans have always been underestimated by their enemies, from Valley Forge to Corregidor and Khe Sanh. American soldiers fight well - and, we will assert, as humanely as war permits. The notion that Americans cannot withstand hardship, practice patience, or face death is a myth without historical basis. The American people elected Richard Nixon and defeated George McGovern, the peace candidate. It is not the American people who cannot endure war, but the America elite.
The weakness of the U.S. is not our soldiers, nor their numbers, but the vast distance that separates American leaders from those who fight. From government officials to media moguls to finance power brokers, few members of the leadership class have children who are at war. To them, the soldiers are alien, people they have never met and don't understand. When the children of the leaders stay home, the leaders think about war in unfortunate ways. As the most powerful nation in the world, we will be fighting many wars. A ruling class that sends the children of others to fight, but not their own, cannot sustain its power very long."
Monday, November 9, 2009
How much is a trillion dollars?
As of mid-October the Federal deficit stood at $1.4 TRILLION, more than three times last year’s deficit under the Bush administration. Current CBO projections are that as government plans stand now the deficit will top $9.1 TRILLION over the next decade, not counting any additional spending from Congress (such as the $1 trillion+ health care plan, or a larger deployment of troops in Afghanistan).
Of course this is just the annual Federal deficit – the amount of NEW debt we are assuming every year. The more important number is the national debt – the amount we already owe back to someone. At the moment our national debt stands at just about $12 trillion dollars. If the Congressional Budget Office estimate of future Federal deficits is accurate, the national debt will stand at around $20 trillion ten years from now.
Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois, 1950-1969) was reputed once to have said “a billion here, a billion there – after a while it all adds up to real money”. These days we would have to change the “billion” to “trillion”.
Few of us have a good sense of what a million dollars amounts to, let alone a billion or a trillion. Remember, a billion is 1000 million. And a trillion is 1000 billion, or a million million, or $1 with twelve zeros behind it . Does that help? Probably not. Let’s put it into more concrete terms:
The US population today stands at about 308 million, so a $12 trillion Federal debt means every man, woman and child in the US owes about $75,000 today, and 10 years from now may owe about $125,000.
If you could make $1 every second ($86,400 a day, $31,5 million a year), it would take you 31,000 years to earn $1 trillion dollars, and 620,000 years to earn $20 trillion.
The government spent $383 BILLION in the last fiscal year just on interest payments on the national debt (by comparison, it spent only $53 billion on education). It our debt reaches $20 trillion, we will pay more than half a trillion dollars in interest EVERY YEAR.
With $1 trillion we could hire about 1.9 million more teachers. With $20 trillion we could hire 19 million new teachers at twice the current pay (and perhaps get twice as good teachers).
With $1 trillion we could build about 16.6 million Habitat for Humanity houses.
A major new hospital in the US costs about $50 million to build and outfit. $1 trillion would buy 20,000 major new hospitals. $20 trillion would build enough major new hospitals for the entire world.
$1 trillion is a lot of money. $20 trillion is an unimaginable amount of money. For a nation – even a wealthy nation like ours - to owe $12 trillion is a pretty heavy debt. To owe $20 trillion would be a crushing debt. This is why a lot of independents like myself are deeply worried about the profligate spending of this administration, and especially this Congress.
Of course this is just the annual Federal deficit – the amount of NEW debt we are assuming every year. The more important number is the national debt – the amount we already owe back to someone. At the moment our national debt stands at just about $12 trillion dollars. If the Congressional Budget Office estimate of future Federal deficits is accurate, the national debt will stand at around $20 trillion ten years from now.
Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois, 1950-1969) was reputed once to have said “a billion here, a billion there – after a while it all adds up to real money”. These days we would have to change the “billion” to “trillion”.
Few of us have a good sense of what a million dollars amounts to, let alone a billion or a trillion. Remember, a billion is 1000 million. And a trillion is 1000 billion, or a million million, or $1 with twelve zeros behind it . Does that help? Probably not. Let’s put it into more concrete terms:
The US population today stands at about 308 million, so a $12 trillion Federal debt means every man, woman and child in the US owes about $75,000 today, and 10 years from now may owe about $125,000.
If you could make $1 every second ($86,400 a day, $31,5 million a year), it would take you 31,000 years to earn $1 trillion dollars, and 620,000 years to earn $20 trillion.
The government spent $383 BILLION in the last fiscal year just on interest payments on the national debt (by comparison, it spent only $53 billion on education). It our debt reaches $20 trillion, we will pay more than half a trillion dollars in interest EVERY YEAR.
With $1 trillion we could hire about 1.9 million more teachers. With $20 trillion we could hire 19 million new teachers at twice the current pay (and perhaps get twice as good teachers).
With $1 trillion we could build about 16.6 million Habitat for Humanity houses.
A major new hospital in the US costs about $50 million to build and outfit. $1 trillion would buy 20,000 major new hospitals. $20 trillion would build enough major new hospitals for the entire world.
$1 trillion is a lot of money. $20 trillion is an unimaginable amount of money. For a nation – even a wealthy nation like ours - to owe $12 trillion is a pretty heavy debt. To owe $20 trillion would be a crushing debt. This is why a lot of independents like myself are deeply worried about the profligate spending of this administration, and especially this Congress.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Recommended: Afghanistan: Heads You Lose, Tails You Lose
Immanuel Wallenstein has one of his usual pungent, not very encouraging but probably accurate assessments in his recent article Afghanistan: Heads You Lose, Tails You Lose.
Worth reading and thinking about.
Worth reading and thinking about.
Recommended: Call White House, Ask for Barack
Thomas Freidman has an interesting Op Ed in today's New York Times, entitled Call White House, Ask for Barack. Friedman basically argues that we ought to walk away from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, because it isn't going anywhere and isn't likely to go anywhere until and unless the two sides feel the need to change the status quo. He quotes James Baker’s line: “When you’re serious, give us a call. Ask for Barack. Otherwise, stay out of our lives. We have our own country to fix.”
An interesting proposal, and one we might consider in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.
An interesting proposal, and one we might consider in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Thoughts on Afghanistan
As President Obama and his team ponder what to do next in Afghanistan, it occurs to me that there are some facts that ought to carry some weight in the decisions:
1. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is thinly populated, with few even moderate-size cities. Securing the cities does nothing effective – the Soviets secured the cities, and it made little or no difference to their problems. The power in Afghanistan resides in the countryside, not the cities.
2. Securing the countryside is almost impossible. The population is thinly spread, much of it in rugged mountainous terrain. It would require deployment of our whole army to secure the countryside, and to what end? We certainly can’t afford to stay there forever.
3. If our objective is to hunt down Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan is the wrong place – such concentrations of Al-Qaeda as exist are in other places, like Pakistan.
4. In general, our presence in Afghanistan is the reason for our current insurgency. The urban elite would like us there, but they are a tiny minority. The vast rural majority would like everyone else out of their territory – they just want to be left alone. And when strangers enter their territory – be they Soviet troops, American troops, or even troops from the central government in Kabul, they fight them. It’s like red ants – they want to be left alone and bite when disturbed.
5. The central government is corrupt, and will remain corrupt for the foreseeable future. It’s the way things are done in that culture. Asking them to suddenly become a different culture is naïve. We can pour all the money we like into the system; most of it will disappear without visible result, just as it has been doing for the last eight years.
Given these facts, it seems to me we ought to sharply limit our involvement in Afghanistan. The costs (which are enormous, in both lives and money) simply don’t justify the possible results. It might make sense to propose the following pact to the Afghan tribes: keep Al-Qaeda out of your territory and we will leave you alone. Allow Al-Qaeda to operate in your territory and you will invite unpleasant intrusion by us. That would give them the incentive to be inhospitable to Al-Qaeda operatives, whom they don’t much like anyway.
1. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is thinly populated, with few even moderate-size cities. Securing the cities does nothing effective – the Soviets secured the cities, and it made little or no difference to their problems. The power in Afghanistan resides in the countryside, not the cities.
2. Securing the countryside is almost impossible. The population is thinly spread, much of it in rugged mountainous terrain. It would require deployment of our whole army to secure the countryside, and to what end? We certainly can’t afford to stay there forever.
3. If our objective is to hunt down Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan is the wrong place – such concentrations of Al-Qaeda as exist are in other places, like Pakistan.
4. In general, our presence in Afghanistan is the reason for our current insurgency. The urban elite would like us there, but they are a tiny minority. The vast rural majority would like everyone else out of their territory – they just want to be left alone. And when strangers enter their territory – be they Soviet troops, American troops, or even troops from the central government in Kabul, they fight them. It’s like red ants – they want to be left alone and bite when disturbed.
5. The central government is corrupt, and will remain corrupt for the foreseeable future. It’s the way things are done in that culture. Asking them to suddenly become a different culture is naïve. We can pour all the money we like into the system; most of it will disappear without visible result, just as it has been doing for the last eight years.
Given these facts, it seems to me we ought to sharply limit our involvement in Afghanistan. The costs (which are enormous, in both lives and money) simply don’t justify the possible results. It might make sense to propose the following pact to the Afghan tribes: keep Al-Qaeda out of your territory and we will leave you alone. Allow Al-Qaeda to operate in your territory and you will invite unpleasant intrusion by us. That would give them the incentive to be inhospitable to Al-Qaeda operatives, whom they don’t much like anyway.
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