This is a recommendation, for those sufficiently interested in military matters, for Wayne Hughes’ 2003 book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd Edition, which is a revision of his 1986 first edition, which was profoundly influential in naval circles. Why this book?
Of the four nations which currently threaten to cause serious trouble in the world, Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, it seems to me only China is a real threat to the US. North Korea and Iran are mostly focused on regime survival, and Russia is a shadow of the old Soviet empire, able to cause trouble along its immediate borders but not much else. China, on the other hand, is addressing its serious internal problems by stoking aggressive nationalism, building up its navy, and might eventually try some military exploits in the China Sea, like invading Taiwan. So if we get into a dust-up with China, it will undoubtedly be a naval engagement in the seas bordering China, and probably within the first island chain.
Now what is important, as Hughes points out, is that naval warfare has changed dramatically since World War II. The advent of long-range precision weapons – ballistic and cruise missiles and now hypersonic missiles – has replaced not only the big guns of warships, but has even changed the role of naval aviation. Ships at sea are now at risk from missile attacks from many hundreds of miles away, and even from shore and inland missile installations. But missiles are expensive and large, and ships which used to carry thousands of rounds of shells can only carry dozens or perhaps low hundreds of missiles, which suggests tactics which encourage ships and shore installations to empty their missile magazines too early. Moreover, precision missiles attacking moving targets require precision targeting, from airplanes, drones, space, or even submarines, which again changes tactics.
All of which means a rethinking of what a modern naval fleet ought to look like. Are carrier battle groups still effective against a near-peer opponent, or are they just compact targets for swarms of precision missiles? Should we build a few big expensive warships or distribute our power among larger fleets of smaller, more expendable ships? Can surface ships even survive a modern naval battle, or should we emphasize stealthy submarines more? Where should we put our limited defense funds most effectively? These are important questions that need an understanding of naval tactics to evaluate.
Hence the recommendation for Hughes’ book. It is academic in nature, though quite readable, so it takes some commitment to study more than read. But I have found it worthwhile.
He has, by the way, written, coauthored or edited several other good books along the same lines, including Fleet Tactic and Naval Operations, 3rd Ed (2018), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (1986), and U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics (2015).
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