My own overall assessment is that somewhere between the second and third week of this invasion Russia lost the war. That doesn’t mean that Russia might not eventually manage by brute force to take over all of the Ukraine, or that Putin will “give up”. There is no doubt a great deal of bloody and gruesome fighting yet to come – perhaps even years of it. But it means that Putin’s dream of reconstituting a mythical “greater Russia” is now permanently beyond his reach. Why?
First, the surprisingly strong sanctions that the West put on Russia’s already-fragile economy has already damaged it beyond recovery. Even if the sanctions were all dropped tomorrow, Western investors would probably be leery of investing in Russia for decades to come, and without Western investment and expertise and technological products, and given Russia’s steep demographic decline and the brain-drain of Russia’s best and brightest young people to the West which has already occurred, it’s hard to see how Russia can recover in this century. But in fact sanctions won’t be dropped tomorrow, and Putin’s aggression will probably result in even more severe sanctions in the months to come, speeding the decline.
Second, Ukraine’s move in 2014 to become Western and try to join the EU and NATO meant that Russia was already coming apart at the seams. The Ukraine is indeed a key part of Russia, including an essential part of its agricultural land, and Putin’s invasion has managed to turn that essential part of Russia from Russian supporters into Russian haters. After the brutality shown by Russian troops Ukrainians will hold this hatred of Russia for decades, or perhaps for centuries. I wouldn’t be surprised if other restive regions in Russia won’t begin to see an opportunity to get out from under Moscow’s thumb too, especially as Putin drains military units away from them to feed into the Ukrainian meat-grinder.
It also means that even if Putin’s military manages to “take over” all of the Ukraine, he will face a debilitating insurgency within his own borders that will probably make Russia’s failure in Afghanistan look mild by comparison, and will be a constant drain on his military and his economy, a drain he already can’t afford.
Actually a prolonged battle in the Ukraine may help the Western world. We, especially we Americans, but this applies to Europe as well, have a remarkably short attention span. Already the news about March Madness basketball and the Supreme Court hearings are beginning to get more news attention than the war in the Ukraine, even though they are inconsequential next to the implications of this invasion. Continuing Russian outrages might help to keep the world’s (meaning the media’s) attention on the ball, and Europe’s new-found solidarity in place.
I would judge that Putin’s difficulties in the Ukraine have substantially reduced the risk that he will push on into NATO countries. And I would guess that China, watching Putin’s military debacle and the strong Western sanctions that came as a result, may well have rethought any intentions of trying to retake Taiwan by force any time soon. China’s economy is much, much more vulnerable to severe Western sanctions than Russia’s.
But just because we are watching the death struggles of a dying nation doesn’t mean that it doesn’t remain dangerous in its struggles. It seems to me the West in general, and the US in particular, need to think through now our responses to the following possible nasty developments:
- Suppose Putin does indeed use chemical weapons in the Ukraine – a real possibility if he gets desperate enough. Is that a red line for us? Would that impel NATO to get more directly involved, and if so, how? If not, what is to keep Putin from using them again and again?- If Russia moves on from the Ukraine to invade a NATO country, what will our response be? By treaty of course we would be bound to help repeal that invasion, and given how poorly the Russian military has performed in the Ukraine, one assumes NATO would prevail. But what exactly does that mean? Do we bomb back into Russia to take out the supporting facilities (airfields, supply dumps, etc). Or do we restrict our attacks to within the NATO country itself, allowing the Russian military a “safe haven” across the border?
- If Putin decides to “de-escalate by escalating” with a low-yield nuclear weapon on some stubborn Ukrainian city, what should our response be? We certainly can’t accede to such blackmail or it will be used against us repeatedly. On the other hand, we don’t want to start a nuclear World War III. (My own idea is that we match Putin 1:1. He takes out a Ukrainian facility with a low-yield nuclear weapon so we take one out too - I suggest the Russian naval base at Sevastopol in the Crimea. That may be a good idea or not – I can’t quite decide.)
And how can we better penetrate the information blackout Putin has imposed on the Russian people? It seems to me this is an important piece of our arsenal that we ought to attend to more. When this is all over and Putin and his murderous regime – one way or another – is gone, we need to think about how best to bring the Russian nation back into the fold of civilization. We missed the opportunity back in the 1990s and are inheriting the results of that mistake; how do we not repeat the mistake
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