Tuesday, September 10, 2013

A Syrian deal that just might work

The sudden emergence of a new proposal last night for Syria to turn over its stock of chemical weapons to international control for destruction is a deal that just might work, and might get President Obama out of the uncomfortable box he has gotten himself into.  It might work because all the principle players have the maximum incentive to make it work.

Syria will probably agree in order to avoid having its military further crippled. For all its bluster in recent days about retaliation for an America attack, President Assad’s regime is just barely hanging on in the civil war, and certainly doesn’t want to be weakened further.

Russia will support the proposal because (a) they don’t want to see Assad fall, (b) it gives them international prestige for having played a significant role in resolving the issue, and (c) because they don’t want a precedent set for international intervention that someday might be used against them.

China will probably go along for much the same reasons.

President Obama and Congress will agree because it gets the president out of the box he put himself into, and Congressional anti-war Democrats can avoid a very difficult vote – to vote against their president or vote against war.

The Arab League will agree because it avoids yet another incursion by America forces, and because it addresses one of their real concerns – Assad’s chemical weapons.

The UN will agree because it gets to play a significant role again in resolving the issue.

And in fact the proposal, if it is really carried out, does address the only real America national  interest in this whole civil war – eliminating the chance that Assad’s chemical weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists who might use them elsewhere.

Deals like this work (a) because it is in the self- interest of all the parties to make it work, and (b) because the consequences of its not working (an American attack on Syria) are worse than the consequences of making it work.   It is only fair to note that a proposal like this wouldn’t stand a chance without the threat of America military action to make it more appealing.

In the oriental game of Go an important tactic is to place stones in threatening positions, which forces the opponent’s hand and restricts his/her play options. The lesson is that military power is best and most efficiently used when it isn’t used, but just threatened.  Of course, if the bluff is called, one must be prepared to follow through, or the threat ceases to be believed.  That is where President Obama got himself into trouble in the first place.