Tuesday, September 16, 2014

Statecraft and the Islamic State

Hard-headed, clear, unambiguous language from Angelo Codevilla’s book “Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial Course in Statecraft", pg 96:
…statecrafts primoidal questions: What exactly are we after? What does it take to persuade whom of what? What means are sufficient to what ends?
So think about the Syria/Iraq conflict, and America’s current responses to it, in the context of those simple, clear questions:

With the Islamic State what, exactly, is our objective?

To exterminate them entirely? What realistically would it take to do that, considering how little success we had suppressing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan after a decade of trying? Once they melt back into the populations in the cities, how do we identify them to kill them?

To “degrade” them to the point where they no longer threaten Iraq? What, realistically, would it take to do that, considering the number of disenchanted Sunni tribes in Iraq who have joined the Islamic State?

To strengthen local forces enough that they can defeat the Islamic State? We spent a decade and who knows how many millions of dollars building up and training the Iraqi army, and they fled in panic when faced with the Islamic State fighters. The Kurds, with our support, may fight well enough to preserve their own territory, but they are in no position to move out and reconquer the rest of Iraq. What other local forces are there that haven’t already joined the Islamic State?

What would it take to persuade whom of what?

What, realistically, would it take to persuade all these Islamic State fighters to stop fighting, and to persuade potential new recruits to not join? Considering that opposing us and recapturing territory is a religious imperative for them, what possible incentive or threat could we offer that would deter them? Do we have any means at all at our disposal to deter them?

What means are sufficient to what ends?

It seems to me perfectly clear what it would take realistically – a massive US ground force (because no one else in the Middle East or the European Union is either willing to do it, or militarily capable of doing it), sweeping through and conquering the whole territory, and then remaining and administering it as brutally as Saddam Hussain did when he ruled. Are we willing to do that?  Of course not.  Our troops would refuse to be as brutal as it would take to suppress ISIS and keep them suppressed, and the American public would refuse to let them be so brutal. Beyond that, there is no pressing American interest that would justify the cost on dollars, equipment and lives to conquer and administer a far-away piece of desert.

So in fact we are unwilling to do what it would take to achieve the ends we want.  So then why are we there at all, wasting American money on a lost cause?