The Iranian Nuclear Deal – the technical aspects

As is usually the case in Washington, there is the actual reality and there is a political reality, and often they are miles apart.  The political reality about the Iranian nuclear agreement is that the right opposes it on principle and the left is trying hard not to get burned by supporting something that may eventually fall apart.

But if one talks to nuclear proliferation experts (I happen to know a couple) the general consensus is that the inspection regime in the agreement, if followed, would make it pretty hard for Iran to hide a significant nuclear program.  IAEA inspectors have 7/24 access to all declared nuclear sites in Iran (sites we already know about) and a process to inspect any suspicious undeclared site with a maximum of 24 days notice.  Now 24 days may seem like a lot of time to clean up any illegal work before an inspection, but it isn’t that easy with nuclear materials – they almost always leave traces that can be detected with today’s technology. And the process to re-impose UN sanctions if Iran violates the agreement is cleverly crafted so that Russia and China can’t block it in the UN Security Council.

So from a technical perspective, the Iranian deal looks acceptable. No system is perfect, and no doubt Iran can find ways to cheat a little around the edges if it wants to, but it looks like it would be very hard (not impossible, but very, very hard) for them to mount the sort of major effort required to build a working nuclear weapon without the inspectors noticing it months ahead of time.

Nevertheless, emotions are high on this issue, both among politicians and among many in the voting public, so the fact that the technical experts are relatively satisfied with the deal probably will have little effect on the raucous public debate that is beginning.

The Iranian nuclear deal

Against all odds we seem to have a proposed deal with Iran to limit their nuclear ambitions. Since any deal would have had to have the (probably grudging) approval of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, it probably means that Iran’s hard liners won’t be able to kill it. And while Republicans seem to be lining up to oppose the deal, I assume President Obama can corral enough Democrats to (probably reluctantly) uphold any veto.  So no doubt we will end up with this deal.

It certainly isn’t a good deal, because it leaves most of Iran’s nuclear facilities intact, except for disabling their heavy water reactor at Arak that could have been used to produce plutonium for weapons.  But it may be an adequate deal if (and only if):

1. the Iranians allow the IAEA inspection system to work as it should, and

2. the Western powers have the political will to put sanctions back into effect if Iran violates the terms of the agreement.

I doubt that this agreement will lead to any early thaw between Iran and the Western powers.  Indeed, Khameni may feel it necessary to let his hard liners have victories in other areas to sooth their opposition to this deal. And no doubt much of the flood of new money from unfrozen Iranian assets and new Iranian oil sales will be used to stir up more trouble elsewhere in the Middle East. 

On the other hand, the flood of new Iranian oil on the market will probably depress the price of oil yet more, and cause Russia’s President Putin more headaches. 

Only time will tell whether this was a naive effort, or a worthwhile diplomatic victory. It's too early yet to judge.