As
is usually the case in Washington, there is the actual reality and there is a
political reality, and often they are miles apart. The political reality about the Iranian
nuclear agreement is that the right opposes it on principle and the left is
trying hard not to get burned by supporting something that may eventually fall
apart.
But
if one talks to nuclear proliferation experts (I happen to know a couple) the general
consensus is that the inspection regime in the agreement, if followed, would
make it pretty hard for Iran to hide a significant nuclear program. IAEA inspectors have 7/24 access to all
declared nuclear sites in Iran (sites we already know about) and a process to
inspect any suspicious undeclared site with a maximum of 24 days notice. Now 24 days may seem like a lot of time to
clean up any illegal work before an inspection, but it isn’t that easy with
nuclear materials – they almost always leave traces that can be detected with
today’s technology. And the process to re-impose UN sanctions if Iran violates the
agreement is cleverly crafted so that Russia and China can’t block it in the UN
Security Council.
So
from a technical perspective, the Iranian deal looks acceptable. No system is
perfect, and no doubt Iran can find ways to cheat a little around the edges if it wants to,
but it looks like it would be very hard (not impossible, but very, very hard) for
them to mount the sort of major effort required to build a working nuclear
weapon without the inspectors noticing it months ahead of time.
Nevertheless,
emotions are high on this issue, both among politicians and among many in the
voting public, so the fact that the technical experts are relatively satisfied
with the deal probably will have little effect on the raucous public debate
that is beginning.
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