I have been thinking a great deal and reading a great deal
about the current state of our navy, particularly in light of the book
recommended in the preceding post. Clearly the proliferation of very quiet diesel-electric
submarines around the world, the evolution of increasingly effective ship-killer
cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles, and the advances in
space-based sensor systems has dramatically changed the naval battlespace.
Looking at the current and planned future developments in the US navy has led
me to the following observations:
The current trend to decrease the manpower on warships is
short-sighted. Yes it cuts the operating costs – fewer sailors to train and
maintain. But in real combat ships get damaged, and what keeps them afloat and
fighting are the damage control teams. Cut the manning down too far and there
aren’t enough sailors for effective damage control teams. Lightly-manned ships
are fine in peacetime, but I fear in actual combat we will lose ships and sailors
we could have saved if there had been enough manpower aboard to do effective
damage control.
The recent focus on shorter range air-superiority fighters
on carriers is short-sighted. Because of the new developments, carrier groups
will likely have to operate further from the battlefront, and their air wings
will need a longer reach. Mid-air refueling can help the problem a bit, but the
relatively slow and unprotected refueling planes are an obvious early target
for any opponent. We need to develop longer-range naval aviation planes.
The new “distributed lethality” concept is a good one –
equip more smaller ships with effective anti-ship missiles, so that every navy
ship, whatever its size, is a serious combatant, instead of just a few of the
major battlewagons. Of course anti-ship missiles are only as good as their guidance
and targeting information, so even the smallest of these ships will need to be
connecting to the evolving combat networks.
A clear weak point in the US military as a whole is the
increasing dependence on space-based sensors and communications assets, which
any serious opponent will probably try to knock out at the very beginning of hostilities,
either with a high-altitude nuclear EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) burst and/or
anti-satellite missiles. China in
particular has invested heavily in developing and testing anti-satellite weapons. We ought to take that into account.
We ought to push hard the evolution of unmanned stand-off
weapons like cruise missiles with intelligent guidance systems that are not
wholly dependent on GPS for their accuracy.
We are likely to need to launch initial attacks from further away, given
the increasingly effective anti-access weapons systems around the world (like
the new Russian S-400 missile system, arguably better than anything the US currently
has).’
We ought to push hard the evolution of long-endurance unmanned
submarine systems, for intelligence, sub hunting, missile launching and mine
laying/detecting. Underwater vehicles
will likely be much safer in a future war than surface vessels, and much likelier
to be able to get close to enemy shores.
The current limit on such vehicles is the power source – batteries just
aren’t high enough capacity yet. But this will change.
We ought to be paying attention to our industrial base. The
US is down to only seven major domestic shipyards capable of building,
maintaining or repairing large navy ships. In World War II we had 29. As it is
we are seeing delays in replacing our end-of-life carriers and submarines because
of shipyard capacity. For example, on our current building schedule we will
have a shortfall of attack submarines for over a decade, between 2025 and 2041,
partly because of funding issues but also because of shipbuilding capacity. (The current requirement to keep 10 attack submarines deployed around the world every day requires 48 total attack submarines in the inventory) If I were an opponent, I would seek early on
to put a few of these shipyards out of action.
Will any of this happen? It depends on whether Congress and
the administrators in power over the next decade or so get real about the
threats, or continue to dither and hold unrealistic expectations about a peaceful world.