Thoughts on upgrading our naval power

I have been thinking a great deal and reading a great deal about the current state of our navy, particularly in light of the book recommended in the preceding post. Clearly the proliferation of very quiet diesel-electric submarines around the world, the evolution of increasingly effective ship-killer cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles, and the advances in space-based sensor systems has dramatically changed the naval battlespace. Looking at the current and planned future developments in the US navy has led me to the following observations:

The current trend to decrease the manpower on warships is short-sighted. Yes it cuts the operating costs – fewer sailors to train and maintain. But in real combat ships get damaged, and what keeps them afloat and fighting are the damage control teams. Cut the manning down too far and there aren’t enough sailors for effective damage control teams. Lightly-manned ships are fine in peacetime, but I fear in actual combat we will lose ships and sailors we could have saved if there had been enough manpower aboard to do effective damage control.

The recent focus on shorter range air-superiority fighters on carriers is short-sighted. Because of the new developments, carrier groups will likely have to operate further from the battlefront, and their air wings will need a longer reach. Mid-air refueling can help the problem a bit, but the relatively slow and unprotected refueling planes are an obvious early target for any opponent. We need to develop longer-range naval aviation planes.

The new “distributed lethality” concept is a good one – equip more smaller ships with effective anti-ship missiles, so that every navy ship, whatever its size, is a serious combatant, instead of just a few of the major battlewagons. Of course anti-ship missiles are only as good as their guidance and targeting information, so even the smallest of these ships will need to be connecting to the evolving combat networks.

A clear weak point in the US military as a whole is the increasing dependence on space-based sensors and communications assets, which any serious opponent will probably try to knock out at the very beginning of hostilities, either with a high-altitude nuclear EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) burst and/or anti-satellite missiles.  China in particular has invested heavily in developing and testing anti-satellite weapons.  We ought to take that into account.

We ought to push hard the evolution of unmanned stand-off weapons like cruise missiles with intelligent guidance systems that are not wholly dependent on GPS for their accuracy.  We are likely to need to launch initial attacks from further away, given the increasingly effective anti-access weapons systems around the world (like the new Russian S-400 missile system, arguably better than anything the US currently has).’

We ought to push hard the evolution of long-endurance unmanned submarine systems, for intelligence, sub hunting, missile launching and mine laying/detecting.  Underwater vehicles will likely be much safer in a future war than surface vessels, and much likelier to be able to get close to enemy shores.  The current limit on such vehicles is the power source – batteries just aren’t high enough capacity yet. But this will change.

We ought to be paying attention to our industrial base. The US is down to only seven major domestic shipyards capable of building, maintaining or repairing large navy ships. In World War II we had 29. As it is we are seeing delays in replacing our end-of-life carriers and submarines because of shipyard capacity. For example, on our current building schedule we will have a shortfall of attack submarines for over a decade, between 2025 and 2041, partly because of funding issues but also because of shipbuilding capacity. (The current requirement to keep 10 attack submarines deployed around the world every day requires 48 total attack submarines in the inventory)   If I were an opponent, I would seek early on to put a few of these shipyards out of action.

Will any of this happen? It depends on whether Congress and the administrators in power over the next decade or so get real about the threats, or continue to dither and hold unrealistic expectations about a peaceful world.