Daniel Ellsberg is remembered
by many simply as the man who leaked the classified Pentagon
Papers to the
press in 1971, to the mighty embarrassment of the administration, which was revealed
to have lied extensively to the American public. The government tried to
prosecute him for this, but prosecutors engaged in so many illegal acts in
trying to discredit him that the charges were eventually dismissed. But in fact Ellsberg was intimately involved in shaping our government's nuclear planning in the Cold War. He knows first hand what he is talking about.
The book is very,
very important, because it details the thinking of American military planners
as they thought about nuclear war and about nuclear strategy during the Cold
War. His discussion of the Cuban Crisis, and what we now know that neither the
Soviets nor we knew then, will alarm you, and it should. The impracticality and
inflexibility of our early nuclear strategy will alarm you. True, Ellsberg is
reporting on what things were like half a century ago – they might be different
today, but then, they might well not be any better, any more practical, or any
safer. Bureaucracies, military or civilian, are relatively inflexible and
change little over decades.
Don’t
read this book if you want to protect comfortable illusions about government
control of nuclear weapons