Based on what American politicians have done and not done in
the past, it seems likely that a short introduction to the realities of
military power would be useful for new and aspiring politicians, to help them
as they think about budget appropriations and authorizations. Here in condensed
form are 15 basic principles any competent politician ought to be aware of.
Most may seem self-evident, but the history of the past few decades would
suggest that some politicians did not find them so obvious.
Principle 1: The
military is a deterrent
The primary function of a nation’s military, at least for
nations not harboring expansionist hopes, is to act as a deterrent. It is very
expensive to maintain a strong military, but it is far more expensive and
riskier to have to fight a war, especially with a peer or near-peer opponent,
and incalculably more expensive to lose such a war. So in the long run the
cheapest and safest of the alternatives is to have a strong enough military
that opponents will estimate that they could not win, or at least that the cost
of fighting a war with us is more than the gains they might make.
There are always those who think a military is unnecessary, a
waste of money. That is an elite delusion that can only be sustained by people
wealthy enough to live in safety, well away from the bad people in the world
and well protected by the local police (the local equivalent of a military). Just
as there will always be playground bullies that need to be restrained by adults
and thugs that need to be restrained by
police, there will always be ambitious tyrants who are willing to go to war to
increase their power and wealth and need to be deterred.
As Plato said and many other have repeated since, “if you
want peace prepare for war” (Si
vis pacem, para bellum). History has certainly reinforced this wisdom.
Principle 2: To be an
effective deterrent, a military must not only actually be strong and effective,
it must be SEEN to be strong and effective.
Obviously a deterrent only works if opponents know it
exists, and believe it is strong enough to make an attack not worthwhile. So a
strong military needs to be seen in action, and effective and successful, from
time to time. There are usually enough nasty police actions required around the
world to provide opportunities for exercising the military and demonstrating
its potential, so long as we don’t pick open-ended situations such as the ones
we picked in the Middle East. General Colin Powell’s dictum that we ought not
to get into any conflict until we understand the exit strategy is a good one.
It is expensive to be the world’s policeman, but it has
advantages beyond just maintaining world stability and order, though that alone
would justify the investment. It produces a steady supply of military personnel
and commanders with actual combat experience, which would be important in the
opening phases of any major conflict. And it provides real-world testing of new
tactics, doctrine and weapons to flush out the inevitable flaws.
Principle 3: Soft
power (negotiation) is always preferable to using hard power (military action),
but it is the very existence of hard power that gives soft power its
effectiveness.
In 1935 the French approached Stalin to ask that he ease up
on the Catholic Church in Russia, in hopes that would help bolster French defenses
against the growing power of Germany. Stalin is reported to have sneered “The
pope! How many divisions has he got?” If the answer had been 50, the
French appeal might have gotten a better response. There is a profound lesson
there.
Principle 4: To be an
effective deterrent, opponents must believe that the nation’s leaders would use
the military if they were provoked.
These first four principles are partly a matter of shaping
the opponent’s mindset, and it is the opponent’s mindset that often determines
whether there will be a war or not. The first Gulf War occurred in part because
Saddam Hussain believed, perhaps on the basis of some ambiguous statements from
our ambassador, that the US would not oppose his invasion of Kuwait, and
perhaps in part because he overestimated the strength of his armies relative to
the US and allied military. Had we succeeded in shaping a different mindset in
Saddam, we might have avoided the massive expense and loss of lives in both
Iraq wars, and Iraq might still be counterbalancing the Iranian ambitions in the Middle East.
Principle 5: For a
military to actually be strong and effective it must train continuously under
realistic conditions.
In past times wars were relatively slow-moving affairs.
Troops walked or moved by horse. There was time to mobilize troops, and even to
train them a bit before reaching combat. Today wars can come into being in
hours, and any military that isn’t fully prepared, fully trained and fully
equipped and ready to respond in hours will lose.
In addition today’s military is highly technological and
requires highly skilled people who have to work constantly to keep their skills
sharpened. That requires constant training under realistic conditions, which
wears out equipment, which then must be continually replaced. This is
expensive, but necessary. There is no way around it. If the military is not
actually fully trained and ready to fight and fight effectively when it is
activated, then all the money spent on it is just wasted and one might as well
not have a military at all.
Principle 6: For a
military to actually be strong and effective, logistics matters as much, or
perhaps even more, than weapons.
There is a saying that “amateurs study tactics,
professionals study logistics.” Wars today consume truly enormous volumes of
supplies; munitions, fuel, spare parts, food and water, etc. etc. Without them
the whole machinery of war – tanks, ships, airplanes, trucks, and fighters all
grind to a halt. So not only does an effective military need good weapons, it
needs a massive logistics chain – warehouses to store supplies, an effective
inventory system to get the right supplies to the right places in time, and
ships, trucks and cargo planes to forward those supplies to the battlefield
fast enough to keep up with the consumption rate. There is no point in
investing in expensive new weapons without investing an adequate amount in the
logistics chain needed to keep them fighting.
Principle 7:
Maintaining the industrial base for military weapons is an essential part of
the logistics chain.
In World War II we were able to convert civilian factories
to military production relatively quickly, because the weapons were not very
sophisticated. Building today’s highly sophisticated weapons - ships, submarines,
airplanes, tanks, munitions, missiles, etc – requires tens of thousands of
highly skilled and experienced trades and highly specialized factories, not
only in the main factories but in the extensive chain of smaller suppliers that
feed the main factories. Close those
factories and lay off those experienced workers and it might take decades to
recover that industrial capacity, and especially to rebuild the pool of skilled
and experienced workers and the essential chain of secondary suppliers.
Therefore an essential part of military readiness is the
maintenance of at least low-rate production of weapons, so as to maintain the
facilities and experience that would otherwise be lost. But of course Principle
5 above in any case will produce a steady need to replace weapons and weapon
systems as they wear out at least from training if not from actual combat.
Principle 8: Weapons systems
sales to allies is an important part of Principle 7 above.
Weapons systems sales to allies helps keep the industrial
base intact and operating, and amortizes the development and production cost of
weapons across more nations, making the whole effort more affordable for
everyone. It also makes military alliances more effective, since if allies are
using the same weapons systems and munitions we are, it makes it easier to
provide replacements, supplies and spares where they are needed in time of war,
and it makes it easier to manage joint operations.
And by the way, agreements for production of US weapons in
allied countries under license is an effective way of providing redundancy of
facilities and experienced workers in the industrial base, which would be
important in any major war. It also encourages allies to purchase US weapons,
since local production helps their economy.
Principle 9: Allies
are essential for more than the obvious reasons.
Obviously allies provide more weapons and fighters, and help
share the costs of any conflict. But alliances also serve subtler purposes;
they are force multipliers in other ways as well. Depending on where they are
situated, allies can provide geographic advantages we wouldn’t otherwise
enjoy. For example, during the Cold War,
it was important that Greenland, Iceland and the UK were allies, because it
allowed the alliance to control the gap between them, which was the path any
Soviet Northern Fleet ship or submarine needed to traverse to reach the
Atlantic. Allies also allow for the establishment of forward bases and forward
intelligence installations that might not otherwise be possible.
Principle 10: Weapons,
doctrine and tactics must constantly be improved, so substantial continuous
investment in research and development is essential.
Build a better tank and opponents will build a better
tank-killing weapon, requiring that we build an even better tank, etc, etc. The
measures-countermeasures war is continuous. We always need weapons and tactics
at least as good as any major opponent, and preferably better, in support of
Principles 2, 3 and 5. And to support Principle 8; why would allies ever buy
weapons that were inferior to their likely opponent’s? But any serious
opponents will be trying to develop weapons and tactics that neutralize any
advantage we might have, so we need always to be pushing ahead.
Principle 11: Weapons
research and development, and weapons procurement, must be managed over the
long term.
The inconsistencies and disruptions and political changes in
directions inherent in year-to-year funding and authorizations are disruptive
of the necessary planning processes, and make weapons procurement more
expensive than it needs to be and research and development less effective than
it can be.
Principle 12:
Military service profoundly shapes – usually for the better - the culture.
Historically military service has been the salvation of many
people, giving them education, saleable skills, a sense of community missing in
their previous civilian lives, a sense of purpose also missing in their
civilian lives, instilling valuable habits, and engendering a commitment to the principles of American democracy often missing among civilians.
I was never in the military, but I spent decades working
among ex-Marines and active Air Force people, and I was always impressed by the
can-do mission-oriented attitude of these people. One time, when our project
had made a really big mistake, the general in charge came to a “come-to-Jesus”
meeting. I’ll never forget what his opening words were: “I don’t give a damn whose fault it was – just tell me how to fix it”.
How often does one hear that in corporate or political settings?
It is hard to quantify this, but it is important to
maintaining a healthy and vital culture. There is much to be said for universal
military service.
Principle 13: General
Powell was right. His principles ought to be followed.
What were his principles? We ought never to go to war unless
we can answer “yes” to all eight of the following questions:
- Is a vital national security interest threatened?
- Do we have a clear attainable objective?
- Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
- Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
- Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
- Is the action supported by the American people?
- Do we have genuine broad international support?
Principle 14: The
cost of war include the costs – both monetary and cultural – of the
psychological damage done to our combatants.
Typically politicians and historian tally up the dead and
wounded of a war, but they seldom if ever consider the number of combatants
unharmed physically but traumatized by the experience. This is a heavy load on the culture, not only
from the medical costs but in terms of suicides, broken marriages, unemployable
people, and even homelessness. War may at times be necessary, but the potential
psychological damage to the general population has to be included in
considering point 3 of Powell’s principles above.
Principle 15: Wars
are won when, and only when, we convince the opponent to stop fighting.
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